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The main thrust of this study is to examine and analyze the problems 
associated with the marketing strategies used since the inception of 
Deregulation in the airline industry. The significance of this study 
is that it provides an overview of the changes brought on by Deregulation 
and how individual airlines chose to deal with these changes and still 
maintain a profit. In addition, the study analyzes the marketing stra¬ 
tegies of Delta Air Lines, Inc. in an attempt to study thoroughly one 
specific airline affected by Deregulation. 
The findings of this study revealed the following: (a) the new entry 
and exit freedom brought on by Deregulation caused more harm than good to 
most of the airline industry; (b) without government intervention, smaller 
airlines had to struggle in order to survive Deregulation; and (c) Deregu¬ 
lation has proved to be a useful tool in determining an airline's capabi¬ 
lity to compete. 
The main sources of information for this study were case studies, 
reports from Senate Hearings, periodicals, newspapers and publications from 
the Research and Marketing Departments of Delta Air Lines, Inc. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of time, the only inhabitants of this planet 
to survive the earth's continuing evolution and environmental changes 
are those who have had the foresight and adaptability to evolve with 
their changing environment. 
The same analogy applies today to the nation's airlines. All 
those people standing in the corner ringing their hands wishing for the 
return of the "Good Ole Days" are going to pass into oblivion, while 
the people who move aggressively to take advantage of the free market 
environment will control this industry for years to come. 
The impact of deregulation on the airline industry as a purely iso¬ 
lated issue is very difficult to assess even now, seven years after the 
passage of the Deregulation Act, because a number of other significant 
factors have clouded the picture. These included rapid inflation, an 
uncertain economy, the soaring of fuel prices from 12 per cent to a 
high of 30 per cent for some of the airlines' operating costs, and the 
air traffic controllers' situation, each of which had a profound effect 
on the airlines.^ With all these factors, it is impossible to assess 
what an airline's strike situation would have been today, if it could have 
only measured the effects of deregulation alone without these extraor¬ 
dinary factors. An attempt to make a definitive statement of the 
iGary Schwatz, "Deregulation on the Airlines," Transportation 
Journal 22 (August 1980): 87. 
1 
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1 ong-tem effect of deregulation today, falls into the category of pro¬ 
phecy. It is simply too early to tell. 
Under deregulation, the way airlines were viewed changed drastically. 
The industry had been developed under the theory that airlines were essen¬ 
tially "public utilities" with all the responsibilities and government 
protections associated with public necessity and convenience organizations. 
Under the scheme of deregulation promulgated in 1978, airlines now became 
"business entities," subject to the same free market forces which govern 
unregulated business and the market-place, not the government, makes the 
ultimate decision of which carrier will fly where, and whether a city 
should have any service at all.? Rates and fares would, henceforth, be 
established through open competition, as should the quantity and quality of 
airline service offerings. The theory was that without government regula¬ 
tion, the efficient companies would prosper, while the inefficient would be 
weeded out and the end result of this process would be better service to 
the public. 
The purpose of this study therefore, is to examine the problems asso¬ 
ciated with deregulation and offer some recommendations for their possible 
resolution. In addition, the study will attempt to analyze various mar¬ 
keting strategies during the airline industry's attempt to survive dere¬ 
gulation. 
The writer has chosen Delta Air Lines, Inc., (DAL) as a case study 
in this project for two specific reasons. The first reason being, the 
surprise to the airline industries that DAL lost money adjusting to deregu¬ 
lation. Secondly, the marketing strategies incorporated by DAL to weather 
the deregulation storm and become the world's fifth largest air carrier. 
2Ibid, p. 113. 
II. PROBLEM AND SETTING 
A. The Problem and Its Setting 
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 led the way toward deregula¬ 
tion of other U.S. industries. This attributes to the shock waves ex¬ 
perienced by the airlines, which essentially served as the guinea pigs in 
the economic deregulatory experiment. 
This one act brought more change to the airline industry virtually 
overnight, than it had experienced in the entire forty years spent under 
formal government regulation. According to past history, no other in¬ 
dustry has ever before been so extensively deregulated, so quickly, and 
after such a long time of relatively stable laws and regulations. There¬ 
fore, the Deregulation Act of 1978 did require a 180 degree shift in air¬ 
line management perspective and operating philosophy. 
David C. Garrett, Jr., President of Delta Air Lines, Inc., in an 
address to the National Retail Banking Conference in Atlanta, Georgia on 
April 11, 1983, explained how DAL has operated and will continue to 
operate its business through the time of transition from regulatory to 
deregulatory: 
Regulated industries, especially those which have 
virtually grown up under regulation, as the airlines 
did, are when deregulated, somewhat in the position 
of children who are given free rein in a candy shop 
after having been limited to one piece of candy a 
month all their lives. Some kids stuff themselves 
indiscriminately with all kinds of sugary concoc¬ 
tions and have to face the consequences of a stomach 
ache later for their overindulgence. Others will 
pick and choose only those candies they like, with 
3 
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minimum after effects. Still others, who do not 
particularly want any candy at all, feel they have 
to participate in the binge in order to prevent the 
the others from getting what should be their share. 
The two most prominent attractions in the airline 
deregulation candy shop were freedom of route entry 
and exit, and freedom of pricing. The temptation to 
go wilds in these areas was great. In the area of 
route expansion, some airlines did indeed go wild 
and overextended their resources too quickly for the 
sake of an impressive route map. 
This gamble may have paid off if the economy had not 
spiralled downward and the cost of fuel had not risen 
dramatically. But they did and these airlines faced 
massive cutbacks in service and furloughing of person¬ 
nel , and the situation even led to bankruptcy of some 
airlines -- (Braniff, Altair, Air New England, etc.)3 
Another effect of removing the shackles on route entry and exit was 
the rise of a host of new airlines, and the rapid increase of airlines 
serving lucrative markets. To illustrate the flexibility found here the 
writer points out that in the 17 years before deregulation, Delta added 
14 new cities to their system. In the short period since October 1978, 
DAL added 18 more. In 1978, 5 airlines served Orlando, 21 new earners 
have entered the Orlando market since then. Even with the Disney influence 
in Orlando, this situation is not unique because other cities experienced 
similar growth in the number of carriers.4 
Many of the new entrants in these markets were new companies who 
were able to enter the airline business with much lower operating cost 
3David C. Garrett, Jr, President, Delta Air Lines, Inc., "Operating 
Successfully in a Deregulated Environment," speech presented to the Na¬ 
tional Retail Banking Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, 11 April 1983. 
4ll.S. Congress, House, Committee On Transportation, Deregulation of 
Airlines in 1978, Industry Impacts, Fares, Operating Cost,"Services and 
Passenger Traffic, Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Transportation on H.R, 26113-1, 2nd sess., 1978, pp. 118-119. 
5 
than the older airlines whose corporate structures had been built under 
regulatory requirements. The lower the operating costs of these airlines 
plus the dramatic increase in competition in the money-making markets, 
the problems of excess capacity during the prolonged recession when demand 
was depressed, and the need of overextended airlines to raise operating 
cash, led to what the press has called, "the airlines price wars." 
The writer will attempt to summarize the marketing strategies used 
by DAL to combat these, as well as, other problems faced in deregulation. 
B. Statement of the Problem 
For a variety of reasons, the operating environment of the airline 
industry has changed so rapidly since deregulation that most of those 
inside and outside the industry have forgotten how constrained things 
were before deregulation. These changes have not followed a smooth 
straight course as the incumbents and new entrants alike have probed 
deeply into the market-place trying to find a unique niche. 
The basic elements of change affecting the airline market-place 
were: 
- Freedom of market entry and exit; 
- Freedom of pricing; 
- Use of automation as a competitive weapon; 
- Significant alteration in the relationship between airlines; 
- Lifting of restrictions on promotional activity; and 
- Shifts in labor management relationship.5 
5Constance T. Barcley, "A Look at Airline Deregulation," U.S. Govern¬ 
ment Publication Monthly Catalog (January-December 1980): 73. 
6 
The combination of all these elements of change created an uncertain 
situation for a number of carriers, who operated successfully under the 
protection of government regulation. The Braniff bankruptcy, and the 
events recently with Continental and Eastern, bring into sharp focus how 
difficult it has been to cope with this combination in some airline 
companies. United Air Lines, however, decided in 1980 that the way to 
profitability in a deregulated industry was to abandon all markets under 
500 miles which completely abandoned many markets such as Atlanta in the 
process. Some five years later United decided that the path to fame and 
fortune is to be the only carrier serving all fifty states.6 
Other carriers, such as the "Old" Braniff, took the exact opposite 
approach during the early stages of deregulation and decided that rapid 
unconstrained growth was the key to success under deregulation. Today, 
the "New" Braniff has found profitability with service in just a few 
market pairs. Both United and Braniff found their strategies to be very 
painful with United losing some $70 million in the year following their 
market retrenchment, and the bankruptcy of Braniff, which resulted in the 
emergence of a significantly smaller airline. 7 
These are only prime examples of some of the strategies used by some 
airlines in their attempt to survive deregulation. However, the writer 
does not wish to imply that these examples, positive or negative, are 
unique only to the airlines mentioned by name. 
6Edward Skloot, "Airline Deregulation Impact on Small and Medium 
Size Carriers," American Statistics Index (Spring 1981): 225. 
7Ibid, p. 233. 
7 
As the industry wrestled with the many opportunities and accompanying 
problems related to deregulation, specific strategies began to emerge out 
of this confusion. The one factor that came more sharply into focus was 
the fact that the airline industry changed its primary focus from an 
operations orientation to one of marketing. Airline marketers found 
themselves in an environment where specific goals and objectives had to 
be developed in order to succeed. The following are a few of the signifi¬ 
cant problems facing Airline Marketers in this environment: 
- Developing Discount Pricing which produced incremental 
revenue rather than diluting overall revenue; 
- Replacing connecting traffic from former interline partners 
who are now competitors; 
- Development of effective outside user automation or CRS 
systems; 
- Unlimited freedom to negotiate the Travel Agent's commission; 
- The ability to barter transportation for services such as 
advertising; 
- The freedom to establish Frequent Flyer Programs for the 
purpose of developing brand loyalty; 
- Unlimited freedom to enter and exit markets; and 
- The Hub/Spoke Concept.8 
These items have figured very prominently in the strategies of the 
carriers who have been able to compete successfully in the current environ¬ 
ment. Of these items, the two most significant are outside user automation 
systems such as Delta's DATAS II, United's APOLLO and American's SABRE, 
and the significant growth in the Hub/Spoke scheduling concept. Basically, 
Sjulie Moll, "A Preliminary Review of the Marketing Strategies in a 
Deregulated Society," Transportation Quarterly (December 1980): 130. 
8 
these two items have been a significant part of the major carriers' market 
domination strategy. 
The writer will expound upon these and other marketing strategies 
used by the airline industry in its attempt to deregulate. 
III. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The concept of reducing the Civil Aeronautics Board's (CAB) route- 
and-rate regulation had a long way to go before it was fully accepted, in 
spite of the Senate's overwhelming approval of the airline regulatory 
reform in May, 1978. It had to pass a House of Representatives whose 
members strongly opposed any measure that would cost their districts air 
service. Although some carriers moderated their protests to the bill 
after looking at their recent profits, and although some had broken ranks 
and ardently supported the bill, airline regulatory reform continued to 
face industry and labor opposition.9 
The legislation, in affect, gave carriers much of the flexibility 
that the CAB, dominated by its chairman, Alfred E. Kahn, then passed out 
on a case-by-case basis. As passed by the Senate, it would let airlines 
reduce fares by 35 per cent and raise them by 5 per cent, enter new 
markets, and terminate services to a community (if a suitable substitute 
could be found), all without the CAB approval that was then required.10 
And the bill allays one fear of its opponents by guaranteeing protection 
to the airline employees who would lose their jobs through carrier 
9Alfred E. Kahn, "Airline Deregulation Has a Long Way to Go," U.S. 
News 84:42 (March 6, 1978): 138. 
1°U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Transportation, Deregulation of 
Airlines in 1978, Industry Impacts, Fares, Operating Costs, Services and 
Passenger Traffic, Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Transportation on H.R. 26113-1, 2nd sess., p. 118. 
9 
10 
bankruptcy or contraction, by offering some route protection against free 
entry into new markets by other carriers, and by requiring a phase-in 
over a period of five years. 
Despite the bill's gradual approach, the House seemed to want no 
part of it. The aviation subcommittee, in its last bill writing session, 
radically weakened its version of the airline bill and left Administration 
lobbyists, who favored less regulation, frantically negotiating a compro¬ 
mise before the subcommittee met again and voted. Observers said that 
everybody liked the bill in the House, but nobody loved it. And they 
also said that it lacked a sponsor of the stature of Senator Howard W. 
Cannon (D-Nev.), Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, whom the 
neutral senators supported simply out of deference.il 
The main dispute in the House was with the so-called "automatic 
entry" provision, which would let carriers enter a designated number of 
new markets each year without applying to the CAB. This was seen as the 
key to true competition between airlines, which had no incentive to lower 
fares on an oligopolistic route. "You need automatic entry as a threat 
over a carrier's head," said Cannon.12 
Automatic entry is also one of the few liberalizations in aviation 
regulation that the CAB does not have the power to grant. The board had, 
of course, granted almost every route request made to it since the arrival 
of Kahn. But, as he liked to point out, he had tenure at Cornell, and 




gone just about as far as its statutory authority permitted. Its relaxa¬ 
tion of fare regulation, for example, has culminated in a process that, 
if approved, would let carriers reduce fares by as much as 50 per cent, 
which is more leeway than that granted by the Senate bill.13 And Kahn's 
inducement of granting new routes in return for price discounts had 
already produced more conditional low fares than there were clouds in the 
sky. 
Automatic entry is also the 1 iberalization most feared by some air¬ 
lines. "We have consistently opposed automatic entry,"14 said an official 
for Delta Air Lines, Inc. Because of the strong opposition, in fact, 
the Carter Administration decided to forego the particular provision in 
the House, in the hope that it would be restored in conference committee 
if the House passed any sort of bill. 
Even without automatic entry, however, some airline executives feared 
that any system requiring deep discount fares to compete effectively 
would only keep a carrier up in the air so long as traffic continued to 
rise as fast as it had in the past. An economic downturn while yield-per- 
passenger was low could send the industry into a financial dive. 
. . . Problems that require serious study, 
extensive computer analysis and hours of 
deliberation by airline experts and manage¬ 
ment with many years of experience and sub¬ 
stantial management responsibilities to 
customers, employees, and shareholders and 
board of directors are mere child's play 
for the critics. Day after day, I've read 
faculty generalizations and glib oversimpli- 
cations about airl i ne management, marketing 
13Kahn, "Airline Deregulation Has a Long Way to Go," pp. 141-142. 
^Garrett, "Operating Successfully in a Deregulated Environment," 
p. 5. 
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and operations. Everyone seems to have the 
right answers, except those of us who are 
he!d to account.15 
Edward E. Carlson, Board Chairman of United Airlines, in 1978, outlined his 
fears of potential problems should the U.S. government deregulate airline 
fares. His fears were not the only ones that the industry paid heed to 
while still in the formative stages. Throughout the airline industry, 
deregulation was termed a financing threat. The threat of deregulation 
hanging over the U.S. airline industry was "perhaps the most serious road 
block" to the carriers securing the estimated $10 billion in external 
financing required through 1985 for equipment acquisition and debt repay¬ 
ment, according to Frederick W. Bradley, Jr., a Vice President of 
Citibank.15 
Bradley addressed the airline industry seminar held by the Financial 
Analysis Federation, during the course of which other strong views, both 
pro and con, were expressed on the subject of deregulation, the main 
contributor being the Ford Administration in 1976. 
During this period, the skepticism of the lenders toward the airlines 
was accentuated by the sort of deregulation foreseen by the Administration. 
As viewed by the financial community, the general uncertainty which sur¬ 
rounded all the carriers' future operating results stemmed from the lenders' 
inability to fully predict in advance the nature of the competitive envi¬ 
ronment under the deregulation proposals. With deregulation, the total 
environment in which the airlines operate changed dramatically and the 
l5Warren C. Wetmore, "Deregulation Termed Financing Threat," Busi- 
ness Week, March 21, 1977, pp. 156-158. 
l^Frederick W. Bradley cited in, Warren C. Wetmore, "Deregulation 
Termed Financing Threat," Business Week, March 21, 1977, pp. 156-158. 
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financial community had little ability to evaluate the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of the various carriers, since historical performance 
would become a totally invalid measure of future performances.17 
There were three major areas where financial people disagreed with 
the government's implicit assumptions regarding the airline industry: 
(1) That a high level of overcapacity inherently existed because of a 
regulatory environment. The financial community, in contrast, believed 
that the overcapacity resulted not from regulatory actions, but from the 
fact that carriers used their historic rates of traffic growth to project 
their future needs when ordering wide-body aircraft in the late 1960s. 
If these growth rates had continued, there would have been no overcapacity. 
(2) That load factors would improve under deregulation. "There is 
nothing in our experience with the industry that leads us to believe that 
the load factors would improve under conditions of free entry and free 
exist from all markets," contends Bradley. The fact is that the opposite 
tendency had been seen. For example, when six new carriers were added to 
the two that served Hawaii from the mainland U.S., load factors were 
seriously eroded, and the market had been highly unprofitable for virtu¬ 
ally all participants for several years. The competition had not reduced 
the excess capacity on the routes. (3) That air fares were too high and 
would be cut with deregulation. On the contrary, the rapid rise in 
airline fares over the years can be traced directly to the sharply in¬ 
creased price of fuel and increases in the industry's cost of labor. 
This is butressed by the fact that, in the light of large traffic expansion 
17Ibid, p. 157. 
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in the first quarter of 1976, the airline industry experienced only modest 
increases in profitability. The fact that inherent assumptions in the 
deregulation proposals are contrary to the lenders' experience with the 
industry heightens the apprehension.18 
Lenders have gone along with the high leverage inherent in most air¬ 
lines' capital structures -- in the decade ending 1975, the avearge debt- 
to-equity ratio rose from 2.0 to 2.5 -- precisely because this inherent 
risk is more than offset by the reduced risk that stems from the regula¬ 
tion of the carriers' competitive ci rcumstances. The lenders believe 
that the airline industry was suffering from being too undercapitalized 
to obtain more debt financing in a non-regulatory environment. 
In a deregulated society, the estimated debt-to-equity ratio of 1 
(one) would be the limit that lenders would tolerate. In order to get to 
this point, the carrier would have to repay $4.6 billion in existing 
debt, or raise that much new equity capital.19 it appears unlikely that 
the industry would be able to effect financial restructuring of this mag¬ 
nitude in the five-year transition period envisioned under the legislative 
proposal. Moreover, even if this restructuring were accomplished, which 
was unlikely, there would still be very limited capacity for future equip¬ 
ment purchases. In light of the industry's known equipment needs to meet 
future traffic growth and counter economic obsolescence, this inability 
to gain the required financing would be devastating. 
Some of the financially weaker carriers would be shut out of the 
financing market and would probably disappear either through merger or 
18Ibid, p. 158. 
19lbid, pp. 157-158. 
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or bankruptcy. The failure of these carriers, especially if accompanied 
by a loss of investment to existing lenders, would do little to counter 
the already strong apprehensions of the financial community toward airline 
investments in general. What was needed to attract investors to the 
airlines was not the dismantling of the regulatory structure, but rather 
a commitment by the regulators toward the industry's return to financial 
wel1-being. 
Fred W. Bradley of Citibank contends, "An enlightened CAB policy of 
timely fare increases, coupled with the low level of new capacity on 
order and strong traffic growth anticipated over the next several years 
would rapidly return carriers to profitability."20 The stronger balance 
sheets resulting from this would facilitate the next round of equipment 
purchases. 
It is a known fact that people tend to be more eager to buy when 
prices are low and more eager to sell when prices are high, that is the 
basis of supply and demand analysis. The writer feels it is now necessary 
at this point in the research to review for the reader the basic concepts 
of supply and demand that obviously apply to the competitive society of 
the airline industry. This useful tool of economics explains how shortages 
and surpluses of goods are related to changes in market prices and under 
what conditions markets can be in equilibrium. Thinking in terms of 
supply and demand also gives additional insight into the role of markets 
as mechanisms for utilizing knowledge. Despite the great diversity of 
the market-place, there are some economic principles so powerful that 
20 Fred W. Bradley, "Deregulation Perils," Vital Speeches 43 (January 
15, 1977): 206-209. 
16 
they are useful in understanding all of them. The principle of supply 
and demand falls into this category. 
The fundamental ideas of supply and demand have been known to 
merchants and traders of all ages. As long as there have been markets, 
sellers have realized that one way to encourage people to buy more of 
their products is to offer them at a lower price, and that one way to get 
more of the goods they want is to offer to pay more for them. 
The writer will not attempt to view the entire scope of the supply 
and demand concept, as it would monopolize the content of the paper. The 
writer will however, give an analysis to make reasonably sure that the 
concept is properly understood. 
The analysis begins with the law of demand. The law of demand says 
simply that in the market for any good, the quantity of that good demanded 
by buyers tend to increase as the price of the good decreases and tends 
to decrease as the price increases, other things being equal.21 This law 
corresponds so closely to what common sense tells one about the way 
markets work that one might simply state it without further elaboration. 
However, the writer wishes to give two definitions of terms used previously, 
the first being quantity demand. This term means effective demand, that 
is, the quantity that purchasers are willing and able to buy at that 
price.22 The effective demand at a particular price may be different 
from the quantity that consumers want and need. Secondly, why attach the 
phrase .1 other things being equal1 to the law of demand? The reason being 
2lEdwin G. Dolan, Basic Economics (Hinsdale, Illinois: the Dryden 
Press, 1977), pp. 135-147. 
221bid , p. 135. 
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that a change in the price of a product is not the only thing that will 
affect the quantity of that product demanded. If people's income go up, 
they are likely to increase the quantities they demand of a great many 
goods, even if prices do not change. When the law of demand is stated, 
which says that the quantity of a good demanded changes when its price 
changes, one places income, prices of other goods, and expectations about 
future price changes in a box labeled 'other things being equal' simply 
in order to be able to study one thing at a time.23 
The next step in the analysis to basically explain supply and demand 
is to examine the relationship between the price of a good and the quantity 
of that good that suppliers are willing and able to provide for sale. 
The relationship between product price and quantity supplied does not 
conform quite so closely to one simple rule as does the relationship 
between price and quantity demanded. The writer does not wish to state any 
general 'law of supply.' Instead, the writer will define some specifics 
concerning supply. First, supply schedules, which is a table showing the 
quantity of a good supplied at various prices. Secondly,' supply curve, a 
graphical representation of the relationship between the price of a good 
and the quantity of that good supplied.24 Unless there is some special 
reason to think that the supply curve for a product has some different 
shape, economists usually draw curves with an upward slope. Sometimes 
special conditions are encountered, and the supply curve loses its upward 
slope. 
231bid , p. 138. 
24Ibid, p. 147. 
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This completes the writer's analysis of the basics of supply and 
demand. The writer further encourages the reader to keep in mind the 
concept of supply and demand in order to better understand its relation¬ 
ship to the subject of deregulation. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
To assist the writer in developing a research design for this study, 
the method of Exploration was chosen. The Exploratory Method will enable 
the writer to accomplish three basic tasks in this study: (1) to gain a 
better understanding and to satisfy curiosity; (2) to test the likelihood 
of doing a more extensive study; and (3) to make fuller the methods to be 
occuppied in a more extensive study.25 The writer has examined many dif¬ 
ferent aspects of Deregulation and given documented information as to why 
it has brought profit for some and destruction for others. 
In compliance with the Exploratory Method, the writer's project 
entailed viewing the complete spectrum of Deregulation and how it has 
effected the marketing strategies of the airline industry. The primary 
data used in this study included the Senate Hearings on Deregulation, 
explaining the government's involvement with the abrupt changes brought 
on by this act. Since it was the government's sanction that there be 
changes made in the airline industry, the writer had little choice in 
determining the main source of data. The secondary data included docu¬ 
mented marketing strategies used by various airlines with particular 
interest in Delta Air Lines, Inc. 
The writer's reasons for choosing Delta Air Lines were two-fold, one 
being its ability to bounce back after extensive loses during Deregulation's 
25Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont, California: 
Wadsworth Publication Co., 1979), p. 85. 
19 
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inception and becoming one of the top five airlines in the world. 
Secondly, the data collected was more accessible to the writer mainly due 
to their being in Atlanta, Georgia. Other articles from magazines such 
as The Transportation Journal, Newsweek, and Time were helpful to the 
writer in this study. 
Phase two of the project consisted mainly of the marketing strategies 
used by Delta Air Lines, Inc. in their attempt to profit as well as gain 
the respect of all those involved in this deregulated society. 
V. ANALYSIS 
One of the biggest changes of Deregulation was the freedom to enter 
and exit a market virtually at will. This was a very important change 
for the airlines. Before they had this freedom, it took about ten years 
and enough paperwork to fill a room to start or delete service in a 
market. Capacity and competition were very carefully controlled by the 
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the process involved reams of economic 
justification and years of hearings involving the interested parti es.26 
When the lid was taken off the market entry process, the temptation 
to go wild in adding new markets was indeed great and some carriers 
yielded to that temptation, entering hundreds of markets virtually over¬ 
night. An insight of things to come materialized right away. The line¬ 
up outside the CAB in Washington when those markets that were authorized 
but unserved were handed out on first come, first served basis saw the air¬ 
line representatives lined up around the block for a couple of days. 
i 
Braniff was the first in line and came away with over 400 hundred routes. 
United took two or three and Delta took only a few. The hook was that 
they had to start serving these routes in 60 days. If the economy had held 
up, it would have been possible that those carriers which spread themselves 
26Marvin S. Cohen, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board, Controlling 
the Economics of the Air Lines," speech presented during Senate Hearings, 
Washington, D.C., 23 March 1979, p. 183. 
21 
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thin to serve those routes could have made a go for it, but that is not 
the way things happened. When the downturn in the economy came, they 
paid the price of overextension of their resources. The best example of 
this, of course, was Braniff. 
Undoubtedly, one of the more significant factors relating to marketing 
entry freedom is the airline's ability to develop and strengthen their 
Hub and Spoke system. Although the Hub Concept was not born with deregula¬ 
tion (Delta has had a hub for over 40 years at Atlanta), deregulation did 
provide the vehicle through which hubs could be quickly developed. The 
quickness with which airlines have moved to the Hub Concept is evident by 
the fact that the route structure of most scheduled airlines is vastly 
different from what it was before deregulation. 
The development of the Hub/Spoke Concept has undoubtedly become the 
"in" strategy of the 80s. All the larger carriers have structured their 
systems so that they had at least one major hub. After the concept's 
inception one could read almost everyday of new hubs being developed; 
Southwest in St. Louis, Muse in Houston, and American in Nashville, to 
name a few. Some of the former regionals such as Piedmont, Ozark and 
USAir have used the Hub Concept to an excellent advantage and have grown 
into successful large carriers as a result.27 
The Hub/Spoke Concept has fragmented the traffic in some medium to 
small market pairs to such an extent that they can no longer support 
nonstop services. Consequently, resources previously allocated to these 
segments have been relocated to hub and spoke. This development has 
27MO11, "A Preliminary Review of the Marketing Strategies in a Deregu¬ 
lated Society," p. 93. 
23 
created a marketing opportunity for carriers such as Delta to compete 
for traffic between almost any pair of points on their system. For 
example, Delta has become a significant factor in the Boston-Los Angeles 
market as they have a total of nine frequencies (connections) over to 
Atlanta, Dallas/Ft. Worth and Cincinnati hubs. 
The main benefit to a hub operation is that an airline can control 
both local and connecting markets making it extremely difficult for a new 
carrier to enter that city.28 A perfect example which demonstrates the 
strength of a fully developed hub is what happened to the New Braniff 
when it attempted to establish a hub in Dallas/Ft. Worth. Returning to 
business in March, 1984, Braniff decided to use a Hub and Spoke strategy 
and scheduled approximately fifty flights in a connecting type operation 
at Dallas/Ft. Worth.29 Fifty flights in most cities would represent a 
meaningful operation; however, with Delta and American having over four 
hundred flights at that time in Dallas/Ft. Worth, the two airlines were 
able to control both the local and connecting passengers making it diffi¬ 
cult and eventually impossible for Braniff to succeed at Dallas/Ft. Worth. 
Realizing the value of a strong hub, the airlines are also applying 
sub-strategies for the purpose of further strengthening their hub. One 
such strategy has been to establish a close relationship with the major 
commuters at the hub city. Delta for example, has created the "Delta Con¬ 
nection" program where ASA, RIO, Ransome and Comair have been given Delta 
flight numbers. 
23ibid, p. 96. 
29ibid, p. 101. 
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The common flight numbers allow connections between the two carriers to 
be displayed in the various reservation systems as on-line connections. 
The effects of this on-line connection is the same as adding another 
Delta city to a hub in that it increases the possible destinations to 
which a Delta flight can connect.30 jn other words, the association with 
the Commuters has enabled Delta to increase its on-line connections (and 
therefore traffic) without adding any new Delta cities. The results of 
the Delta Connection program has far exceeded the expectations of both 
Delta and the Commuters, as connections between Delta and the Commuters 
have increased substantially. 
The use of the Hub and Spoke Concept has been and will continue to 
be a widely utilized and successful strategy. It has, however, encountered 
its share of problems and roadblocks over the past few years which will 
in all possibility cause the development of hubs to moderate in future 
years. 
One problem is that a number of airports such as New York, Washington 
and Chicago have limited amounts of landing slots during peak hours which 
prevents airlines from adding new service into these airports during the 
time of day when they could maximize their connect ions.31 Other airports 
not operating with slot restrictions, such as Dallas/Ft. Worth and Atlanta, 
do have times of day when additional flights would do nothing but increase 
arrival and departure delays. A second problem facing the Hub and Spoke 
30HO1 lis Harris, Vice President of Marketing, Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
"Marketing in a Deregulated Environment," speech given at the Stockholders 
Meeting, Monroe, La., August 1984. 
31Ibid. 
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Concept is the lack of facility or gate space at the terminals. By defini¬ 
tion, an airline can only have as many flights arriving in a connecting 
complex as it has gates.32 Many airlines have saturated their gates during 
peak complexes preventing expansion in these time frames. 
The bottom line of the slot and gate situation is airlines are not 
going to be able to expand from certain hubs to the degree that they 
would like. What is in the future for hub expansion? Robert W. Coggin 
of the CAB believes, 
There will be a movement away from the mega-hubs 
like Chicago, Atlanta, Dallas/Ft. Worth and others 
towards the development of secondary or mini-hubs 
much like Pan Am and American. The development of a 
new generation of aircraft will also have an impact 
on the future of the Hub and Spoke Concept."33 
A second item which has dramatically affected airline marketing 
strategies has been the evolution of airline's Computer Reservation Systems 
(CRS). Starting in 1976, at which time United announced it would be of¬ 
fering travel agents a computerized mini-reservation system, the major 
airlines have been involved in a hectic race to automate as many agencies 
as they could with their own CRS system. 
This race has been extremely competitive, although sometimes unethical, 
primarily because the rewards of automating an agency are very substantial. 
One reason is that travel agencies are controlling more and more of the 
airline's business. For example, in 1980 agencies produced 55 per cent 




increased to 70 per cent. With agencies generating as much revenue as 
they do, it was (and is) certainly advantageous for an airline to have as 
many agencies as possible operating with their own CRS system. 
At the outset, one key element of the CRS battle was the ability of 
the contracting carrier to bias their system as an attempt to capture 
additional business. The biasness was accomplished by penalizing airline 
schedules in such away that the contracting airline schedul e woul d appear 
to be superior when in fact, many times it was not. The net result of 
the biased schedules was that the CRS airline normally was booked when an 
agency's client requested the fastest or best schedule between two 
ci t i es.34 
As the writer stated earlier on Delta's CRS system, DATAS II, is 
unbiased, with all airline schedules being displayed equally. When they 
designed their system, they felt that the travelling public should be 
offered the best schedules available regardless of the airline, which 
meant, that their flight selection should not be distorted. 
Fortunately, for the travelling public, the CAB agreed with Delta's 
viewpoint on the bias issue and in late 1985, in one of its final acts, 
set down a series of rules which basically forbade the airlines from 
having any bias in their schedule displays.35 Schedules, therefore, 
should be presented in all CRS systems .equally, which in turn, will offer 
the paying customer the best available schedules. 
34Ibid. 
35Cohen, "Controlling the Economics of Air Lines," p. 218. 
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An interesting sidelight to the bias issue, is the fact that the 
government's (CAB) intervention represents the first form of Deregula¬ 
tion applied to the airlines since Deregulation. As one might be aware, 
there have been arguments from a number of parties, such as union groups, 
small communities and passenger associations that deregulation has caused 
more harm than good and the industry should be reregulated. While there 
is no mass movement by the government to reregulate, the point has been 
made that they will interfere if they feel something is out of line. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that deregulation has been a challenge, perhaps 
the greatest challenge the airline industry has ever faced. Every company 
involved must plan its own strategy and make its own choices. In the 
airline industry, it will be some time before the final results are in; 
however, during the interim each airline should be ready as ever to 
provide the finest possible service to the public. 
In such competitive situations, fare adjustments are made on a market- 
by-market basis. This obviously has the potential for producing pricing 
anomalies which cause much of the concern previously mentioned. It 
would be poor economics for an airline to pull fares down in one market 
pair simply because they have reduced fares in another market. Excep¬ 
tions are made to that general policy when fares are reduced at a major 
hub. In this case, the fare at the hub plus a modest add-on in perimeter 
markets where the customer might otherwise drive to the hub if there was 
a large variance in the fares. By pricing the product in this matter, 
some airlines have managed to control the traffic from- the point of 
origin. 
This is one of many examples the writer has found in the research 
process. Delta Air Lines, Inc. was the writer's case study and was a 
forerunner for many marketing, managing and fare strategies during deregu¬ 
lation's inception. Another significant technique used by Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., deserves honorable mention. 
28 
29 
With the emphasis shifting to a yield per passenger mile basis, it 
became necessary for management to introduce a relatively new element to 
the day-to-day operation of an airline. At Delta, it was called, 'Yield 
Management.' Delta's leadership and success in this area has been the 
subject of many favorable reviews by security analysts and financial 
pub!ications. 
Basically, what this system does is allow Delta to predict with a 
great deal of accuracy how many full fare and discount seats they need to 
inventory on a market-by-market and flight-by-flight basis. These inven¬ 
tories are based on historic demand curves and booking trends with the 
uniqueness of each market taken into consideration. With the proper dis¬ 
count seat mix in place, Delta has been able to maximize revenues on each 
individual flight.36 
This process along with all the others Delta has introduced to the 
airline industry has proven profitable. Although the major airlines are 
now doing a fairly good job of maximizing revenues with its yield manage¬ 
ment programs, they still have been forced to lower costs in order to 
remain competitive with the low-cost carriers from both a profit and fare 
standpoint. The expense item that the majors have focused their attention 
on has been labor costs, primarily because it represents the largest 
single expense in the industry (approximately 40 per cent) and is one of 
the few expenses the airlines have any control over. The writer has 
chosen not to elaborate on the topic of labor as research for this topic 
is very indepth. The topic was only injected to merely better explain 
yield management. 
^Garrett, "Operating Successfully in a Deregulated Environment," 
p. 11. 
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In concluding the research, the reader must agree with the writer 
that deregulation has forced a great change in airline marketing strate¬ 
gies, most of which have benefited the travelling public. While predicting 
the future is risky business, the writer has found through research that 
the airline industry has only begun to realize all the changes that deregu¬ 
lation will bring about. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The writer will at this point of the research offer recommendations 
based on the findings of this study. There are numerous solutions sug¬ 
gested by authorities on the subject of Deregulation for the problems 
that the airline industry has faced during this period. A question of 
survival and profit has been the underlining purpose for all concern. 
The marketing strategies used by one airline were closely monitored by all 
the others, so as to follow suit, if the program proved successful. 
Undoubtedly, the most widely used and most successful program of 
this nature was the Frequent Flyer Programs. Introduced by American in 
May, 1981 and copied by at least 26 other airlines since then, the program 
which was started as a means for the airlines to reward their best cus¬ 
tomers has evolved into an excellent vehicle for building brand loyalty. 
With the reward of free or reduced travel, passengers most definitely 
tend to travel with the airline with which they have accumulated the most 
travel mileage. 
The most valuable aspect of these types of programs is the fact that 
it makes it extremely difficult for a competitor to enter the market of 
an incumbent carrier. With many miles accumulated on an airline, given 
equal schedules and pricing, there is little incentive to travel with 
another airline. In this regard, a carrier in its hub city has a tremen¬ 
dous advantage over a carrier that does not have a hub there, to the 
extent that passengers enrolled in that carrier's program will not sacri¬ 
fice losing miles by travelling with a new carrier. 
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On the other side of the coin, the carrier is faced with a competi¬ 
tive disadvantage in cities where they do not have a hub. Therefore, the 
writer recommends that each carrier with a Frequent Flyer Program of this 
nature be willing to offer mileage regardless of the airline travelled 
during travel from Point A to Point B and back to Point A. 
The writer further contends, that carefully planned route expansion 
and fleet development would aid in establishing a balanced equation during 
normal operations. While some airlines did in fact show an increase in 
route entry, if routes had been added to the existing route system a 
steady traffic growth may have been established without so many airlines 
having to go bankrupt or completely shut down. 
In the area of aircraft development, Delta Air Lines, Inc. has been 
a leader. The company has actively spearheaded the development of new 
technology aircraft because it firmly believes that the airline industry 
is one which cannot afford to adopt a 'status quo' attitude in this area. 
Based on the philosophy of one of the leaders in the airline industry, 
the writer recommends that all other carriers follow suit, if not, in all 
probability fleets would gradually deteriorate and service and efficiency 
would deteriorate along with it, sending the industry and air travel 
itself into decline. 
Competition is what the airline industry is all about now. In the 
long-term view of things, the low cost producers of seats will have a 
distinct advantage over the competition. To be a low cost producer of 
seats, an airline must have a modern, fuel and noise efficient fleet. An 
airline should use its financial strength to keep its fleet young and 
efficient, even in the view of declining earnings. 
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In summation, each airline should strive to be an aggressive competi¬ 
tor, but without panic, and without trying to expand its operation every¬ 
where overnight or change the basic character of its operation. Using 
the new freedoms brought on by deregulation to achieve orderly and signi¬ 
ficant growth and to streamline its operating systems. 
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